In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die Vorsokratiker: Ein philosophisches Portrȧt by Thomas BuchheimIstván BodnárThomas Buchheim. Die Vorsokratiker: Ein philosophisches Portrȧt. München: C.H. Beck, 1994. Pp. 262. Paper, DM 48.00.This book is a continuous narrative of highlights of presocratic philosophy. The vista offered by Buchheim is revisionary. The presocratics are behind a curve of the road of the philosophical enterprise. What we usually perceive is a mirage created by the doxographic tradition, emanating ultimately (...) from Aristotle. This much might be uncontroversial: the history of presocratic philosophy has been for the last two centuríes a continuous effort to liberate the remains of those early philosophers from the imputations of later authors. But Buchheim’s project is more ambitious than our ordinary occupation with the presocratics. He postulates a specific, markedly presocratic type of appropriation of the world, and then uses this as a yardstick to elicit a new understanding of the mutilated body of the early texts. Presocratic thought is not theoretical, but rather reactive; it cannot extricate itself from the situation in which it is directed at its object.While some of his discussion is perceptive, the chapters abound in idiosyncratic interpretations. It will suffice to mention only a few of Buchheim’s central claims by way of illustration. Although it has been widely held that Anaximander’s apeiron is not only boundless, but also indefinite, Buchheim’s contention that it should be seen as a disorienting and chaotic matrix which provides no foothold for the discerning and distinguishing mind overshoots the mark. This claim does not mesh well with the allowance in Anaximander that there can be a plurality of simultaneous worlds. There can be a disorienting extension beyond the single cosmos, but several (and as some testimonies would claim, evenly distanced) worlds cannot possibly be separated by a medium which defies the notion of extension altogether.Few will be convinced by Buchheim’s claim that Heraclitus did not formulate a doctrine of opposites because he, coming before Parmenides, could have had only a conception of “counteractive parties in an originally unifying contention” (82), since Heraclitus’ provocative pronouncements would thereby be diluted into mere platitudes. Since Empedocles never calls his rhizömata elements, Buchheim impugns the Empedoclean origin of the four element doctrine. For this he needs to explain away much of the evidence of the fragments. Some of the images Empedocles deploys would suggest a mere juxtaposition of the ingredients, some might indicate some more intimate bond arising between these. As Buchheim aptly notes, the choice in this matter is not obvious. Nevertheless there are places where Buchheim’s interpretation is at a serious disadvantage. Empedocles B8, on the standard reading would rule out the [End Page 521] notion of a phusis (growth, generation) or teleutë- (end, perishing) of any mortal thing, and would allow for the mixιs (mixing) and diallaxιs (separation) of what is mixed together. Immortal things, devoid of generation and perishing by default, are understandably not taken into account here. On Buchheim’s reading, however, Empedoclean rhizömata would be allowed to grow, and hence, by a similar reasoning, to perish.In Chapter 5, Buchheim accuses Aristotle of systematically replacing the dynamically loaded expressions of the ancient atomists, characterizing the ultimate building blocks of nature, with static, geometric idioms. The sole exception where Aristotle does not rob the atomists of this dynamic conception of atomic nature, Buchheim claims, is Physics 8.9 265b23ff. But the uniqueness of the passage rests on Buchheim’s idiosyncratic translation. On the standard interpretation (going back at least to Simplicius) Aristotle asserts only that, according to the atomists, nature performs local motion, and not—as Buchheim would have it—that the nature of the atoms is the very performing of local motion.Contrary to Buchheim’s general characterization of presocratic thought as imbued or integrated with the circumstances of cognition, Anaxagoras’ nous is pure and distinct, not mixed with any other ingredient of the universe. For this reason, Buchheim in his final chapter presents Anaxagoras as a transitional figure between presocratic thought and later, classical metaphysics. The details of this claim, just like the overall characterization of the presocratics, are bound... (shrink)

Aristotle asserts at 1073b10-13 that he intends to give in Metaphysics XII.8 a definite conception about the multitude of the divine transcendent entities, which function as the movers of the celestial spheres. In order to do so, he describes several celestial theories. First Eudoxus’s, then the modifications of this theory propounded by Callippus, and finally his own suggestion, the introduction of yet further spheres which integrate the celestial spheres into a single overarching scheme. For this, after explaining the spheres providing (...) the component motions of each planet, Aristotle introduces so-called rewinding spheres (anelittousai), which perform contrary revolutions to the ones performed by the spheres carrying the planet. (shrink)

Anaximander is the first philosopher whose theory of the heavens is preserved in broad outlines. According to the sources the celestial bodies are huge rings of compressed air around the earth, each visible only where it is perforated by a tubular vent through which the fire contained in it can shine. Greatest and farthest of them is the sun, next comes the moon and under them there is the ring of the stars. It is a common practice to put and (...) answer the following questions: ‘…why he should have placed the stellar circles or rings closer to the earth than are the sun and the moon.’ ‘…why these lower rings of stellar ρ do not obscure the brighter but more distant bodies.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 139-141 [Access article in PDF] Helen S. Lang. The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics: Place and the Elements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 324. £40. This is an unsuccessful book. Some of the reasons for its failure are complex, others are more simple. I cannot address all, but shall simply discuss the fundamental claims about four large (...) topical units—about nature, place, void and elemental motion—indicating why they are untenable.Discussing the celebrated definition of nature in Physics II.1, Lang contends that in it the verb kineisthai should be taken in the passive voice, that nature should be understood as a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest, and not just blandly as a principle of motion and rest. Since Aristotle asserts in Book VIII of the Physics that the elements contain a passive principle of motion (255b30f), Lang's contention would mean that the elements in this respect do not differ from other natural entities. This is highly unlikely, given the systematic contrast of self-moving composite natural entities and simple, unarticulated elemental natures at 255a5-18. Lang goes so far as to assert [End Page 139] that "kineisthai is always passive, not middle (or reflexive), in both Plato and Aristotle" (42). Fortunately, we need not accept this on her word: although kineisthai can be both passive and middle, in some instances (notably in aorist and future), passive and middle forms are different. Accordingly, Lang's claim must be rejected on the basis of the very first passage she helpfully quotes as an "additional example" in n.24 on p.42: Physics VII.1 242a37f employs the middle voice future, kinesétai, and not the passive form, kinethésetai. The passage, teeming with different forms of the verb kineisthai, describes an entity which contains the principle of motion in itself, which moves naturally. This indisputably shows that Lang's contention is wrong.Lang, contrary to the well-entrenched scholarly consensus, claims that place is not the first (=innermost) extremity or first unmoved boundary of the containing body, but the extremity of the first body, i.e., of the celestial sphere. (The transposition of the qualification "first" happens in several, non-conclusive installments, see e.g. 99f, or 106f.) This transposition, however, runs counter to several of Aristotle's stipulations about place. Lang's all-encompassing extremity can only be the common (koinos) place of everything there is, whereas Aristotle is keen on finding the proper or particular (idios) place, a location which contains nothing but the entity itself (209a32-b1). The entirety of the discussion in Physics IV.4-5 attests that it is this latter place which Aristotle defines here: the first place is neither smaller, nor bigger than the thing in place (211a1f, a23-29, a31-33, etc.). Aristotle repeatedly stresses that the extremities of the contained body and its container are "in the same" (211a33f, b11f). This remark surely would be out of place about the remote extremity of the first containing body. It is also repeatedly set out that the direction of explanation is bottom-up, and not top-down, as Lang's all-encompassing universal place would require: it is by being in a particular locus that we can be said to be in (the sphere of) air, and by this in the heaven (209a33-b1, 211a23-26).Lang's proposal is not just theoretically unappealing. The traditional should not be rejected recklessly, without an attentive discussion. After all, it "apparently beg[a]n immediately with Theophrastus," as Lang rather uncannily admits (105), and it was Theophrastus, and not Lang, who studied and worked for decades with Aristotle.A key assertion of the chapter on void also rests on a grave philological blunder. Lang argues that interpreters switched from Aristotle's expression "that through which" (to di' hou) to "medium," thereby surrendering the original net of notions, in which the natural activity of the element impeded the progression of the... (shrink)

Saving the appearances (sôzein ta phainomena) often features as a programmatic description of the aim and objective of ancient astronomical theory. The paper, after an expository section, discusses some earlier proposals for what such a programme presupposes. After this, through a survey of the usage in Plato and Aristotle of some key terms—among them the verb sôzein—describing the relationship of an account to what it is an account of, submits that the phrase in this semantic framework could express the crucial (...) property of an account that it is faithful to the phenomena, and it does not overrule or discard them. (shrink)

Aristoteles verweist bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten für die weitere Diskussion von Fragen auf ›die Probleme‹. Gleichwohl können diese Verweise – mit vielleicht nur einer einzigen Ausnahme – nicht auf die im Corpus Aristotelicum unter dem Titel Problemata physica enthaltene Textsammlung referieren. Offenbar handelt es sich dabei um eine peripatetische Zusammenstellung, die häufig von theophrastischem oder sogar noch jüngerem Material abhängt.

Aristotelian natures – internal principles of motion and rest – provide a rich account of the goal-directed behaviour of natural entities. What such natures cannot account for, on their own, are cases of teleology across natures, where an entity, due to its nature, furthers the goals of another entity. Nevertheless, Aristotle admits such teleological configurations among natures: most notably Politics I.8 1256b15-20 claims that plants are for the sake of animals and animals are for the sake of humans. The paper (...) first scrutinizes two recent attempts– by Mohan Matthen and David Sedley – at an explanation of such teleology across natures. The fundamental move these proposals make is that they claim that the universe has a nature of its own. Accordingly, teleology across natures could be explained as the operation of this single cosmic nature. But the introduction of a cosmic nature contravenes fundamental strictures of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Hence the third section of the paper formulates an alternative proposal, that the teleological interaction across different natures is underpinned by the self-benefittingactivityofindividualnaturalentities,whichareable to use the natural processes of their environment to their own advantage. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Principles of Physics The Science of Natural Beings Motion, Causal Interaction, and Causational Synonymy Aristotelian Kinematics Aristotle's Theory of the Continuum The Causes of Elemental Motions Unmoved Movers Bibliography.

Timaeus after assigning four regular solids – tetrahedra, octahedra, icosahedra and cubes – to fire, air, water and earth, respectively, submits at 57d–e that different kinds of gaseous, liquid or solid materials, and their interactions and intertransformations require that the four solids occur in different sizes. The paper discusses two different strategies for the generation of these differences in size: the traditional one, which allows that the triangles that are the fundamental building blocks of these solids do occur in different (...) sizes, and the one proposed by Cornford, which suggests that triangles of exactly the same size may form different structures, and these can give rise to solids of different sizes. Considerations are drawn from descriptions of some specific interactions , from the account of sight , and physiology . All in all, these considerations seem to favour the traditional account. After this, in a final section I suggest that the specific claims Timaeus makes about the status of his account about the elements – certainty for the assignment of tetrahedra to fire, octahedra to air, and icosahedra to water, whereas the half-equilateral triangle as the fundamental building block of these solids is introduced in a tentative manner, explicitely stressing that this detail is revisable – makes it unsurprising that he does not discuss in detail how solids – and triangles and squares – of different sizes are constructed. (shrink)

The paper is about a chreia—a one-liner used as a grammatical exercise sentence—that presents Pythagoras as proscribing an expression from admissible linguistic usage. This injunction is funny, because it can be construed as Pythagoras railing against the use of a particular variant form of an adjective—and also as against the use of items denoted by that adjective. In the paper I add to this line of interpretation the further point that the chreia also claims that in this latter construal the (...) injunction was Pythagoras’s signature insight, making him the philosopher that he was. (shrink)

Edition du commentaire de la Physique par Facinus de Ast, à partir du ms. Fribourg, Cordeliers 26. Seuls le l. I, trois questions du l. II et une de chaque l. III et V ont survécu. On y retrouve souvent les outils de l'analyse syntaxique du XIVe s. La solution de Facinus sur les futurs contingents suit d'assez près celle d’Ockham et quelques qq. du l. I semblent critiquer des thèses maîtresses de Jean de Ripa.

This edition of the Tractatus de maximo et minimo of Facinus de Ast from the sole surviving manuscript, Fribourg Cordeliers MS 26, is the first part of the edition of his philosophical works. Facinus read bk 1 of the Sentences in Paris in 1362/63, and his philosophical works most probably preceded his theological studies. The Tractatus palpably shows how widespread influence the Calculator enjoyed at this time in Italy and/or France.

Hermeneutical Considerations on Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and on the Revisiting of his Path of Thinking (I). Starting with preliminary philological-hermeneutical considerations concerning the way Heidegger’s Black Notebooks can and should be dealt with, as well as concerning the question what tasks may be derived from them for future research, the paper attempts to discuss the Black Notebooks applying a variety of methods and multiple approaches. Themes that are discussed at more or less length include: Time factor and the formulation of (...) our task; explanation and understanding or the way a philosophical path should be approached and dealt with methodically (hermeneutically); the theme related to “Heidegger and anti-Semitism” and the question concerning individuality; prejudices from a hermeneutical perspective and the way to deal with them; relapses and their philosophical explanation; missing and increased sensibility; Heidegger and Hegel; equivocality and the dark side of the “formal indication”; Lukács, Scheler and the devil; Heidegger’s great being-historical treatises and their greatness; suggestions for a reconsideration of Heidegger’s way of thinking. -- One important hermeneutical claim brought to bear on the various discussions is this: just as it would be in-appropriate in our dealing with Heidegger’s texts to disregard Heidegger’s own self-interpretations, it would be no less inappropriate to consider those self-interpretations--which themselves call for interpretation--as telling us the sole and ultimate truth. (shrink)

This chapter proposes to reconstruct and make sense of Gadamer's position with regard to the concept of prejudice in its relation to several neighboring, that is, related concepts. These concepts include, first of all, pre‐understanding.The method of clarifying the meaning of concepts through reconstruction of their history is based on a particular conviction or, more exactly speaking, a philosophical position. According to it, philosophical concepts are determined in their meaning not through a random choice to designate them with that word (...) “but rather on the basis of their historical background”, and “legitimate philosophizing needs to be able to account historically for its own concepts”. The chapter then shows how Gadamer's treatment of the issue was anticipated and indeed delineated by Heidegger. The particular prejudice we are urged to liberate ourselves from is the assumption that past ages knew better how things were than we do. (shrink)

Hermeneutical Considerations on Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and on the Revisiting of his Path of Thinking (II). Starting with preliminary philological-hermeneutical considerations concerning the way Heidegger’s Black Notebooks can and should be dealt with, as well as concerning the question of what tasks may be derived from them for future research, the paper attempts to discuss the Black Notebooks applying a variety of methods and approaches. Themes that are discussed at more or less length include: Time factor and the formulation of (...) our task; explanation and understanding or the way a philosophical path should be approached and dealt with methodically (hermeneutically); the theme related to “Heidegger and anti-Semitism” and the question concerning individuality; prejudices from a hermeneutical perspective and the way to deal with them; relapses and their philosophical explanation; insufficient and exaggerated sensibility; Heidegger and Hegel; equivocality and the dark side of the “formal indication”; Lukács, Scheler and the devil; Heidegger’s great being-historical treatises and their greatness; suggestions for a reconsideration of Heidegger’s way of thinking. – One important hermeneutical claim brought to bear on the various discussions is this: just as it would be inappropriate in our dealing with Heidegger’s texts to disregard Heidegger’s own self-interpretations, it would be no less inappropriate to consider those self-interpretations – which themselves call for interpretation – as telling us the sole and ultimate truth. This second part of the paper dedicates special attention to the question of re-examining Heidegger’s whole philosophical itinerary in the light of the Black Notebooks. (shrink)

My aim in the present paper is to show the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion as an important step on his way to his magnum opus . First, I wish to exhibit traits characteristic of Heidegger's path of thinking in terms of his confrontation with phenomenology, historicism, hermeneutics, and Lebensphilosophie . I will then argue, in a second step, that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, as well as (...) of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in Being and Time . Both theology and philosophy offer a conceptual elaboration of something previously enacted or lived and, in doing so, are at the same time meant to refer back to and reinforce what they grow out of—faith or factical life. (shrink)

The claim that there are significant parallels and connections between hermeneutics and humanism may be plausible from the mere fact that the magnum opus of contemporary hermeneutics, Gadamer's Truth and Method, opens with a chapter on “The significance of the humanist tradition for the human sciences”, which is discussed in this chapter. A brief interpretation of the Gadamer's chapter and its philosophical background will be followed by a short interpretive reconstruction of the origin and history of the concept of humanism (...) and its interconnections with hermeneutics. Possible or plausible consequences of what has been said include the following two theses: hermeneutics is humanism; and the contemporary form of humanism is hermeneutics. From this perspective, hermeneutics may be said to be the heir of the legacy of the humanist tradition and may be entitled to be called its form in the twentieth and twentieth‐first centuries more than any other philosophical stance. (shrink)

Dieser Band dokumentiert die Beiträge, die auf einem dem Gedenken Martin Heideggers gewidmeten deutsch-ungarischen Symposium vom 2. bis 4. November 1989 in Budapest vorgetragen wurden. Wesentlich für das Zustandekommen der Tagung war, daß sich schon seit einiger Zeit ein zunehmendes Interesse am Werk Heideggers in Ungarn gezeigt hatte. Ein Teil der ungarischen Philosophen hat sich zunehmend der Rezeption zeitgenössischer Philosophie, so auch der Heideggerrezeption und -forschung zugewandt. Daß 1984 eine ideologisch unbelastete Heidegger-Monographie aus der Feder des Herausgebers dieses Bandes veröffentlicht (...) werden konnte, ist ein Indiz für die Wandlung der Grundstimmung. Aufgrund schon bestehender Kontakte schien der Moment gekommen zu sein, einen ersten Austausch im engeren Fachgebiet zwischen deutschen und ungarischen Philosophen zu veranstalten, die sich mit dem Werk Heideggers beschäftigen. Der 100. Geburtstag Heideggers sowie die gerade zur Zeit des Symposiums erschienene ungarische Ausgabe von Heideggers Hauptwerk »Sein und Zeit« verliehen dem Fachsymposium besondere Aktualität. Das Thema der Tagung wurde umfassend formuliert, um den Referenten die Möglichkeit zu geben, angesichts der Interpretation des Heideggerschen Werks sowohl Wege der Erschließung darzustellen als auch zu »Irrwegen« kritisch Stellung zu nehmen. (shrink)

The connections between hermeneutics and ontology cannot be restricted to the ontological (re)conception of understanding and interpretation. The ontological thematization of understanding and interpretation provided by Heidegger in Being and Time, is preceded by another, more original, and more comprehensive interrelation between hermeneutics and ontology. The former, the ontological thematization of understanding and interpretation may be seen to be, as it were, but a “derivative” case of this more primordial interdependence or fusion of ontology and hermeneutics which has always already (...) been operative or set into motion from the very first pages of the work in terms of a reciprocal dependence of the Being‐question (ontology) and a (vague and average) “understanding of Being” (hermeneutics). This chapter attempts to reconstruct and elaborate on the emergence of this twofold relation on Heidegger's path of thinking up to and inclusive of Being and Time. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to figure out whether Aristotle's response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is a success. By "response" it is meant not simply the reasons Aristotle offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument for fatalism. This paper finds that a) Aristotle's argument for fatalism is essentially bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition implies necessity, (...) b) that Aristotle's solution is to restrict bivalence, c) that this solution is coherent, and d) that while this solution does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in blocking the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9. El objetivo de este trabajo es esclarecer si la respuesta de Aristóteles al argumento a favor del fatalismo en De Interpretatione 9 resulta exitosa. Por "respuesta" se entienden no solo las razones que da Aristóteles para destacar porqué el fatalismo no concuerda con la manera en que llevamos nuestras vidas, sino también la solución que ofrece para bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo. El artículo plantea a) que el argumento de Aristóteles respecto del fatalismo consiste esencialmente en la bivalencia más el hecho de que la verdad de una proposición implica necesidad; b) que la solución de Aristóteles es restringir la bivalencia; c) que esta solución es coherente, y d) que si bien esta solución no elimina la posibilidad del fatalismo, sí logra bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo ofrecido en el capítulo 9. O objetivo deste trabalho é esclarecer se a resposta de Aristóteles ao argumento a favor do fatalismo em De Interpretatione 9 é bem-sucedida. Por "resposta" se entendem não somente as razões que Aristóteles dá para destacar por que o fatalismo não está de acordo com a maneira em que levamos nossas vidas, mas também a solução que oferece para bloquear o argumento a favor do fatalismo. Este artigo propõe que: a) o argumento de Aristóteles a respeito do fatalismo consiste essencialmente na bivalência mais o fato de que a verdade de uma proposição implica necessidade; b) a solução de Aristóteles é restringir a bivalência; c) essa solução é coerente, e d) embora essa solução não elimine a possiblidade do fatalismo, consegue bloquear o argumento a favor dele oferecido no capítulo 9. (shrink)

In Gadamer's hermeneutics the relationship of philology to philosophy and to the Geisteswissenschaften often became a focus of his hermeneutical reflection. In the first part of my contribution, I investigate and reconstruct this relationship in Gadamer's thinking. In the second part, I take up a recent debate about Gadamer in Hungary, and in connection with it offer a case study in which Gadamerian thinking is present in a twofold way: as that with which I am reflecting and at the same (...) time what it is about – the object of this reflection. The first part comes to the conclusion that the interconnectedness of philology and philosophy, with each side referring to the other, is central to Gadamer's work; it is moreover the element in which Gadamer's writings move. It is the focus on the text as text versus a focus on the text as the mediator of a matter [Sache] that makes the difference between philology and philosophy. This difference may give rise to a kind of tension, and this is addressed in the second part of the paper, by way of showing a passage from Gadamer's work susceptible to philological objections. (shrink)

In this book, internationally recognized scholars in philosophical hermeneutics discuss various aspects of language and linguisticality. The translations of Hans-Georg Gadamer's two recent essays provoke a preliminary discussion on the philosopher's polemic claim in Truth and Method—"Being that can be understood is language." Topics addressed by the contributors include the relationship of rituals to tradition and the immemorial; the unity of the word; conversation; translation and conceptuality; and the interrelationship between the art of writing and linguisticality. This work is of (...) critical importance to anyone interested in Gadamer's claims regarding the boundaries of language, the transition from the prelinguistic to linguistic realms, and the role of rituals in this transition. (shrink)

Motto: “History is denied not because it is ‘false’ but because, although impossible to be assimilated as present, it remains active in the present.” Martin Heidegger -/- “It is to be expected that people remember their past and imagine their future. But in fact, when they write discourses about history they imagine it through the prism of their own experiences and when they try to ponder over the future they refer to presupposed analogies with the past, until, in a double (...) process of repetition they imagine their past and remember their future.” Lewis Nanier. (shrink)

The analyses in the book investigate the possibilities and foundations of a completely new philosophy of history, although outlined in dialogue with M. Heidegger. The fundamental questions the author asks are: Why, wherefrom is there history? Why are we humans historical? Why is there historiography? Primarily and ultimately, the response to each of these questions is: because we are MORTAL. Accordingly, the first chapter tackles the possibilities and lays the foundations of an ontology of history. Built upon these, the second (...) chapter analyses the being of the PAST and its existential characteristics – as NOT-BEING-ANY-MORE, as HAD-BEEN-NESS. Chapter three turns towards the FUTURE and analyses its existential characteristics as NOT-YET-BEING. Chapter four is an explicit return to the dialogue with Heidegger, which surfaces the main aspects of the essential belonging together of the fundaments and origins of philosophy and history. The Appendix is an applied philosophical research related to the previous subjects which examines the interlacements of DEATH and SECRET in the phenomenon of TERRORISM. (shrink)

„...nem egy általában vett szerző -/- szól az általában vett olvasóhoz..." -/- Fehér M. István1 -/- -/- „A filozófia a legmélyebb, legfölkavaróbb -/- kérdésekkel hivatott foglalkozni. -/- Végleges megoldásukat nehezen élné túl." -/- Hajós József 2 -/- -/- -/- Egyre több írás – iromány – hermeneutikai szituáltságát konstituálják manapság a „tudományos konferenciák". Gyakran persze ezek „helyettesítik" be a tapasztalatot, a tapasztalat élő kihívásait is. Úgyhogy meglehetősen ritkaságszámba megy az olyan esemény, amikor egy-egy előadás valóságos konferencia-szerű alkalma és tényleges visszhangja igazán (...) találkoznak azzal a szervességgel, amelynek a lehetőségeit rajtuk – azaz, voltaképpen: esetlegességükön – kívül mindig sok más egyéb vonatkozás is artikulál. (shrink)

Contents: Stephen White: Opuscula and Opera in the Catalogue of Theophrastus' Works Han Baltussen: Theophrastean Echoes? The De Sensibus in the Platonic and Aristotelian Tradition Pamela M. Huby: Arabic Evidence about Theophrastus' De Sensibus Todd Ganson: A Puzzle Concerning the Aristotelian Notion of a Medium of Sense-Perception Istvan M. Bodnar: Theophrastus' De igne: Orthodoxy, Reform and Readjustment in the Doctrine of Elements Georg Wohrle: Ps-Aristoteles De Coloribus -aA Theophrastean Opusculum? David Sider: On On Signs - R.A.H. King: Nutrition and Fatigue (...) Amneris Roselli: Greek Medical Theories of Fatigue Sabine Vogt: Theophrast, De Vertigine Armelle Debru: La sueur des corps: le De sudore de Theophraste face a la tradition medicale John Dillon: Theophrastus' Critique of the Old Academy in the Metaphysics H. Takahashi: Syriac Fragments of Theophrastean Meteorology and Mineralogy Index Contributors and Editors. (Franz Steiner 2002). (shrink)